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Abstract 
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stimulating the economy, in reforming the public pension system, and in achieving fiscal 
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We find that the structure of Japan’s current consumption and income taxes is 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, the consumption tax has attracted widespread interest in Japan 
because of its potential role in stimulating the economy, in improving the finances of the 
public pension system, and in achieving fiscal reconstruction.  For example, many 
economists have suggested reducing, then gradually raising, the consumption tax as a 
way of stimulating the economy and generating inflationary expectations, both the 
ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the number one opposition party (the Democratic 
Party of Japan) have proposed using the consumption tax to improve the finances of the 
public pension system, and the government is proposing a sharp increase in the 
consumption tax as a way of achieving fiscal reconstruction.   
In this paper, we conduct a theoretical analysis of the consumption and income 
taxes from the viewpoints of efficiency and equity, we evaluate the past and present 
structure of Japan’s consumption and income taxes, we consider the role of the 
consumption tax in stimulating the economy, in reforming the public pension system, 
and in achieving fiscal reconstruction, and finally, we make policy recommendations 
based on our findings.  We find that the structure of Japan’s current consumption  
and income taxes is problematic from the viewpoints of both efficiency and equity and 
make policy recommendations that will simultaneously improve both the efficiency and 
equity of Japan’s tax system. 
The structure of the paper is as follows:  In section 2, we conduct a theoretical 
analysis of the consumption and income taxes from the viewpoint of efficiency and 
equity; in section 3, we evaluate the past and present structure of Japan’s consumption 
and income taxes; in sections 4, 5, and 6, we consider the role of the consumption tax in 
stimulating the economy, in reforming the public pension system, and in achieving fiscal 
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reconstruction, respectively; and finally, in section 7, we make policy recommendations 
based on our findings.   
 
2. A Theoretical Analysis of the Consumption and Income Taxes 
 In this section, we conduct a theoretical analysis of the consumption and 
income taxes.  When evaluating a tax, there are two criteria that are commonly 
used—efficiency and equity.  Efficiency refers to whether a tax distorts the decision- 
making process of economic agents (i.e., whether it causes an excess burden), and equity 
refers to whether a tax has favorable or unfavorable distributional consequences.  In 
this section, we evaluate the consumption and income taxes from the viewpoints of both 
efficiency and equity. 
 
2.1. Efficiency 
First, we analyze the consumption and income taxes from the viewpoint of 
efficiency. 
 
2.1.1. The Consumption Tax   
The consumption tax introduces at least two distortions: it distorts the 
allocation of consumption among different consumption goods (excluding leisure), and it 
distorts the allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption goods.     
Looking first at the distortion in the allocation of consumption among different 
consumption goods (excluding leisure), the consumption tax distorts this allocation 
decision by raising the prices of some or all consumption goods.  A comprehensive 
consumption tax raises the prices of all consumption goods (excluding leisure) by the 
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same percentage, but this does not necessarily mean that such a tax does not cause any 
distortions.  The reason is that different consumption goods have different 
compensated price elasticities of demand.  Even if the prices of all goods are increased 
by the same percentage, goods whose compensated price elasticity of demand is 
relatively high (in absolute value) will show a more pronounced decline in demand than 
goods whose compensated price elasticity of demand is relatively low (in absolute 
value). 
 Ramsey (1927) first pointed out this problem and proposed the “inverse 
elasticity rule” or “Ramsey rule” as a way of eliminating the distortion in the allocation 
of consumption among different consumption goods caused by the imposition of a 
consumption tax.  This rule states that the tax rate of each good should be inversely 
proportional to the absolute value of the compensated price elasticity of demand of that 
good.  As pointed out by Hatta (2004a, 2004b), this rule is not very useful in actual 
practice because it suffers from an important defect: it makes the unrealistic 
assumption that all cross-price elasticities of demand are zero and that even goods with 
a high compensated price elasticity of demand (in absolute value) have no substitutes.  
Moreover, since necessities often have low compensated price elasticities of demand, 
applying Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule will require us to impose higher tax 
rates on necessities, making the tax regressive.  Thus, implementing the inverse 
elasticity rule may or may not improve efficiency, and moreover, it will have an adverse 
impact on equity. 
 Looking next at the distortion in the allocation of consumption between leisure 
and other consumption goods, it is almost impossible to accurately measure the leisure 
consumption of each individual (i.e., the number of hours each individual devotes to 
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leisure), and thus it is not feasible to impose a tax on leisure.  And if all consumption 
goods other than leisure are taxed while leisure is not, this will lead to a distortion in 
the allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption goods, with 
leisure being overconsumed and all other consumption goods being underconsumed. 
 Corlett and Hague（1953）pointed out that this distortion can be alleviated by 
taxing complements of leisure (such as summer homes, yachts, golfing goods, movie 
tickets, etc.) more heavily and substitutes of leisure (such as washing machines, 
vacuum cleaners, electric ranges, etc.) more lightly than other consumption goods. 
    
2.1.2. Income Tax 
The income tax introduces at least two distortions.  The first distortion caused 
by the income tax is that, by taxing labor income, it discourages labor, or to put it 
another way, it subsidizes leisure, as in the case of the consumption tax.  Thus, it leads 
to an undersupply of labor and to an overconsumption of leisure.  The solution is to 
make labor income tax-exempt. 
The second distortion caused by the income tax is that, by taxing capital income 
(interest, dividends, rent, etc.), it discourages saving.  The solution is to make capital 
income tax-exempt. 
However, if both labor income and capital income are made tax-exempt, the 
government will not be able to raise any tax revenue.  Thus, the government needs to 
impose taxes on either labor income and/or capital income.  It can be shown that it is 
optimal to tax labor income if labor supply has the lower compensated price elasticity 
and to tax capital income if saving has the lower compensated price elasticity.  It is 
believed that labor supply has a lower compensated price elasticity than saving, and if 
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that is the case, it is optimal to make capital income tax-exempt and to tax only labor 
income (i.e., to impose a wage tax).  
 
2.1.3. Conclusion 
As we have seen, both the consumption and income taxes cause distortions in 
consumer behavior.  The only tax that does not cause any distortions is the poll or 
lumpsum tax, which collects the same amount of tax from each individual, or if 
individuals are heterogenous, a poll or lumpsum tax that collects the same amount of 
tax from all individuals of each type, but poll taxes are unrealistic, not to mention 
regressive.  Thus, the only choice is to impose a tax that causes one kind of distortion 
or another. 
 As Hatta (2004a, 2004b) notes, it is often the case that, by mitigating one 
distortion, one exacerbates a different distortion.  For example, raising the tax rate on 
complements of leisure and lowering the tax rate on substitutes for leisure will mitigate 
the distortion in the allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption 
goods, but at the same time, it will exacerbate the distortion in the allocation of 
consumption among different consumption goods (excluding leisure).  Thus, there is a 
trade-off between these two kinds of distortions. 
      An optimal tax structure is one that takes account of this trade-off and 
maximizes social welfare.  According to Hatta (2004a, 2004b), an optimal tax structure 
is one in which a higher tax rate is imposed on strong complements of leisure, a lower 
tax rate is imposed on strong substitutes for leisure, and a uniform tax rate is imposed 
on all other goods (goods with a low cross-price elasticity of demand with leisure).  In 
other words, he finds that it is optimal to use consumption taxes to alleviate the 
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distortion in the allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption 
goods.   
 
2.2. Equity 
In this section, we analyze the consumption and income taxes from the 
viewpoint of equity. 
 
2.2.1. Consumption Tax 
Since the propensity to consume generally decreases with income, a sales tax 
that is imposed at the time of sale will be regressive and hence inequitable.  The 
solution is to impose an expenditure tax instead of a sales tax.  An expenditure tax is a 
tax in which individuals file a tax return and pay a tax on the difference between their  
income and their saving (where saving is calculated as the net increase in their assets).  
The two taxes are similar in the sense that they are both imposed on consumption but 
they are different in the sense that a sales tax cannot be made progressive while an 
expenditure tax can be made as progressive as one wants.  The problem is that an 
expenditure tax is difficult to implement and has never been tried in actual practice in 
any country.   
Given that an expenditure tax is not practical, the second-best solution is to 
impose a sales tax but to impose a lower or zero tax rate on food and other necessities 
and to impose a higher tax rate on luxury goods.  There are many examples both in 
Japan and in other countries of certain goods being exempted entirely from 
consumption taxes or of differential tax rates being imposed on different commodity 
groups.  For example, in the United States, there is no national consumption tax, but 
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most states have a state sales tax, and in about half of the states that have a sales tax, 
food is tax-exempt, and in most states that have a sales tax, prescription drugs are 
tax-exempt.  As another example, in many European countries, the consumption 
(value added) tax has two or three tiers, with a lower tax rate being levied on food.  As 
a final example, Japan imposed a commodity tax on certain consumption goods 
(primarily luxury goods) until the general consumption tax was introduced on April 1, 
1989.  Thus, many countries including Japan have made efforts to alleviate the 
regressivity of the consumption tax. 
 
2.2.2. Income Tax 
The income tax can be made as progressive as one wants, and thus it is easy to 
achieve equity using the income tax. 
 
2.2.3. Conclusion 
 Unless the consumption tax takes the form of an expenditure tax, which is not 
practical, it is difficult to achieve full equity using the consumption tax, and thus it is 
easier to achieve full equity using the income tax.   
   
2.3. Consumption Tax or Income Tax? 
In order for the government to function, it needs tax revenue, and thus the 
government needs to impose one kind of tax or another.  The trick is to find a tax 
system that simultaneously achieves efficiency and equity.  The problem is that, 
although it is sometimes possible to achieve efficiency and equity simultaneously, the 
two objectives are often contradictory. 
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For example, in the case of the consumption tax, since the compensated price 
elasticity of demand is often low (in absolute value) in the case of necessities, if we apply 
Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule, we would have to set a higher tax rate for 
necessities than for other goods, and thus we would have to sacrifice equity for efficiency.  
By contrast, since Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule entails imposing a higher tax rate on 
complements of leisure and since many complements of leisure are luxury goods, we can 
achieve both efficiency and equity simultaneously by implementing Corlett and Hague’s 
rule.  
In the case of the income tax, it is optimal from the viewpoint of efficiency to 
tax labor income more heavily than capital income (assuming that labor supply is more 
price-inelastic than saving), but in general, the share of capital income in total income 
rises with income, and thus from the viewpoint of equity, it is optimal to tax capital 
income more heavily than labor income.  Thus, the two objectives conflict in this case. 
Hatta (2004a, 2004b) argues that we should not attempt to achieve equity 
through the consumption tax because there are other taxes (such as the progressive 
income tax, the land tax, the inheritance tax, etc.) that are better suited to attaining 
equity.  Hatta (2004, 2004b) asserts that we should leave the attainment of equity to 
these taxes and that we should use the consumption tax to alleviate the distortion in the 
allocation of consumption between leisure and other consumption goods by applying 
Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule, but as argued earlier, we can achieve both efficiency 
and equity simultaneously by applying Corlett and Hague’s rule.  
 
3. An Evaluation of Japan’s Tax System 
In this section, we evaluate the past and present structure of Japan’s 
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consumption and income taxes from the viewpoints of both efficiency and equity. 
 
3.1. Consumption Tax 
First, we evaluate the past and present structure of Japan’s consumption tax.   
 
3.1.1. Efficiency 
Until March 31, 1989, Japan did not have a general consumption tax but 
commodity taxes ranging from five to 30 percent were imposed on certain goods (mostly 
luxury goods).  If we look at the structure of the commodity taxes, food and other goods 
with a low compensated price elasticity of demand (in absolute value) were tax-exempt, 
meaning that Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule was not being followed and that 
the opposite was being done.  Looking next at whether the structure of the commodity 
taxes was consistent with Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule, many of the goods upon 
which commodity taxes were imposed are clearly close complements of leisure (such as 
golfing goods, billiard goods, motor boats, water game supplies, hand gliders, musical 
instruments, televisions, stereos, etc.), and some of them are close substitutes for 
leisure (such electric vacuum cleaners, electric washing machines, etc.) so it is not clear 
whether or not the structure of the commodity taxes was consistent with Corlett and 
Hague’s (1953) rule.  However, it is probably the case that commodity taxes were 
imposed more frequently on complements of leisure than on substitutes for leisure, 
meaning that they alleviated the distortion in the allocation of consumption between 
leisure and other consumption goods to some extent, thereby improving efficiency. 
 The Japanese government abolished the commodity taxes on selected goods 
and introduced a 3% general consumption tax on April 1, 1989, and raised the general 
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consumption tax from 3% to 5% on April 1, 1997.  This general consumption tax is 
uniform, and thus it does not reflect either Ramsey’s (1927) inverse elasticity rule or 
Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule.  Thus, it distorts both the allocation of consumption 
among different consumption goods (excluding leisure) as well as the allocation of 
consumption between leisure and other consumption goods and is not an efficient tax by 
any means.  However, unlike the earlier commodity taxes, food and other necessities 
with a relatively low compensated price elasticity of demand (in absolute value) are no 
longer tax-exempt, and thus the current general consumption tax is closer to Ramsey’s 
(1927) inverse elasticity rule than the earlier commodity taxes.  However, whereas the 
earlier commodity taxes adhered to Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule to some extent, the 
current general consumption tax does not adhere to this rule at all.  
 Thus, by moving from the earlier commodity taxes to the current general 
consumption tax, the distortion in the allocation of consumption among different 
consumption goods (excluding leisure) was alleviated but the distortion in the allocation 
of consumption between leisure and other consumption goods, a more serious problem, 
was exacerbated.  Thus, there is a high probability that the overall efficiency of the 
consumption tax declined due to the transition from commodity taxes to a general 
consumption tax. 
 
3.1.2. Equity 
In the case of the commodity taxes that were in effect until March 31, 1989, 
food and other necessities were tax-exempt and a high tax rate was imposed on many 
luxury goods.  Thus, the earlier commodity taxes achieved equity to a considerable 
extent. 
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    However, the general consumption tax that was introduced on April 1, 1989, is 
a sales tax rather than an expenditure tax, and moreover, the tax rate on food and other 
necessities is not relatively low or zero and the tax rate on luxury goods is not relatively 
high.  Thus, it can be said to be a regressive and thus inequitable tax.  
 
3.1.3. Conclusion 
As we have argued, the transition from commodity taxes to a general consumption 
tax probably reduced the efficiency of the consumption tax and clearly reduced the 
equity thereof.  Thus, from the viewpoint of optimal taxation, one cannot say that it 
was a desirable tax reform. 
 
3.2. Income Tax 
Next, we evaluate the past and present structure of Japan’s income tax. 
 
3.2.1. Efficiency 
In the past, the Japanese tax code included many tax breaks for saving (capital 
income) such as the maruyuu system (the tax-free system for small deposits), and as a 
result, the tax rate on capital income was probably lower than the tax rate on labor 
income.  Thus, (assuming that labor supply is more price-inelastic than saving) the 
structure of Japan’s income tax scored high with respect to efficiency.  
However, the maruyuu system was restricted primarily to those aged 65 or 
older on March 31, 1988, and it is scheduled to be abolished totally (in principle) on 
December 31, 2006, and other tax breaks on saving (capital income) have also been 
abolished.  This has reduced the efficiency of the income tax and will cause it to decline 
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even further in the future. 
Turning to a separate issue, the progressivity of Japan’s income tax has 
declined over time, as discussed in section 3.2.2. below, and this will improve efficiency 
to the extent that it alleviates the disincentive effects on the labor supply of 
high-income individuals.  However, since labor supply is believed to be relatively 
inelastic, the efficiency gains from reduced progressivity are presumably relatively 
small. 
 
3.2.2. Equity 
Japan’s income tax is non-linear and progressive, but the degree of 
non-linearity and progressivity has declined over time.  Table 1 shows how the number 
of brackets and the range of tax rates have fluctuated over time, and as this table shows, 
the degree of non-linearity and progressivity and hence the equity of Japan’s income tax 
has declined since the 1980s.  
 
Table 1: Trends in the Number of Brackets and in the Range of Tax Rates of the 
National Income Tax in Japan 
1971~83: 19 brackets（10～75％） 
1984~86: 15 brackets (10.5～70％) 
1987: 12 brackets（10.5～60％） 
1988: 6 brackets（10～60％） 
1989~98: 5 brackets（10～50%） 
1999～present: 4 brackets（10～37％） 
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Next, we would like to confirm these trends from another perspective.  Tables 
2 and 3 show the share of taxpayers for whom each marginal tax rate applied in 1988 
and 2001, and as can be seen from these tables, the 1999 income tax reform caused 
the share of taxpayers for whom the 10% marginal tax rate applies to increase 
sharply from 60.8% to 69.2% and caused the share of taxpayers for whom the 20% 
marginal tax rate applies to decrease sharply from 28.4% to 22.0%, as a result of 
which the lowest marginal tax rate applied to a full 70% of taxpayers.  This 
corroborates the trend toward a less non-linear, less progressive, and less equitable 
income tax. 
 
Table 2: The Share of Taxpayers for Whom Each Marginal Tax Rate Applies (1998) 
Marginal Tax Rate     Share of Taxpayers 
   10％                60.8％ 
   20％             28.4％ 
   30％                6.5％ 
   40％                2.3％ 
   50％                 2.0％ 
Source: Kokuzei-chou Toukei Nenpou-sho (The Statistical Yearbook of the National Tax 
Agency), 1998 edition 
 
Table 3: The Share of Taxpayers for Whom Each Marginal Tax Rate Applies (2001) 
  Marginal Tax Rate    Share of Taxpayers 
   10％                   69.2％ 
   20％                 22.0％ 
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   30％                    5.3％ 
   37％                   3.6％ 
Source: Kokuzei-chou Toukei Nenpou-sho (The Statistical Yearbook of the National Tax 
Agency), 2001 edition 
 
3.2.3. Conclusion 
Assuming that labor supply is more price-inelastic than saving, the gradual 
abolition of various tax breaks for saving (capital income) has lowered the efficiency of 
Japan’s income tax, and the reduction in progressivity has reduced the equity thereof.  
Thus, Japan’s recent income tax reforms have reduced the efficiency as well as the 
equity of the income tax, and thus one cannot say that they were desirable from an 
optimal taxation standpoint. 
 
4. The Role of the Consumption Tax in Stimulating the Economy 
The Japanese economy is finally recovering from more than a decade of 
recession and price deflation, and during the recession, many economists advocated 
using the consumption tax as a tool for stimulating the economy and ending price 
deflation.  In this section, we explain how one could stimulate the economy using the 
consumption tax and the merits of doing so. 
On January 18, 2002, one of the co-authors of this paper wrote an opinion piece 
in Nihon Keizai Shinbun in which he proposes lowering or abolishing the general 
consumption tax for a fixed period of time and then raising it gradually (see Horioka 
(2002) for details). 
Such a policy would have at least four advantages: 
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First, it would be effective.  By lowering or abolishing the general 
consumption tax for a fixed period of time and then raising it gradually would stimulate 
consumption and hence the economy as a whole because consumers would accelerate 
purchases of consumption goods, especially non-perishable goods, in order to take 
advantage of temporarily lower consumption taxes.   
Second, it would not cost the government very much in foregone tax revenue.  
If the permanent income hypothesis applies, a temporary income tax cut would not have 
much impact on consumption because it would not have much impact on permanent 
income.  In order to be effective in stimulating consumption, the income tax cut would 
have to be permanent so that it increases permanent income, but a permanent income 
tax cut would lead to a massive loss of tax revenue.  By contrast, a consumption tax cut 
would be more effective if it were temporary because only a temporary consumption tax 
cut would induce consumer to accelerate their purchases of consumption goods.  Thus, 
a temporary consumption tax cut would be preferable to a permanent consumption tax 
cut for two reasons—first, because it would be more effective, and second, because it 
would not cost the government nearly as much in foregone tax revenue.  
Third, it would be effective as a means of ending price deflation.  Lowering or 
abolishing the general consumption tax for a fixed period of time and then raising it 
gradually would generate inflation, and if the inflation that is generated causes 
inflationary expectations to take root, inflation will continue even after the gradual 
increases in the consumption tax rate end.  Thus, if all goes well, the same fiscal policy 
would simultaneously stimulate consumption and end price deflation.  
Fourth, it would be equitable.  Since the propensity to consume generally 
declines with income, low-income consumers will receive a disproportionate share of the 
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benefits of the temporary consumption tax reduction or abolition.  Thus, the temporary 
consumption tax reduction or abolition would have the added benefit of increasing 
equity. 
 Thus, a policy of temporarily reducing or abolishing the consumption tax would 
confer at least four advantages and does not have any major disadvantages. 
 The Japanese government relied on temporary income tax cuts to stimulate 
consumption and hence the economy as a whole during the decade-long recession, but as 
noted earlier, theory predicts that income tax cuts will not be effective unless they are 
permanent but permanent income tax cuts would have been too costly to the 
government in terms of foregone tax revenues.  Thus, the Japanese government would 
have been better off temporarily reducing or abolishing the consumption tax instead of 
lowering income taxes as a way of stimulating the economy.  
 The Japanese economy is finally recovering, but the recovery is showing signs 
of slowing down, and if the Japanese economy should slide back into recession, the 
Japanese government should consider using a temporary reduction or abolition of the 
consumption tax as a way of stimulating the economy.  
   
5. Pension Reform and the Consumption Tax 
 Japan’s public pension system is, in effect, a pay-as-you-go system, meaning 
that the pension benefits of retirees are financed by the pension contributions of current 
workers.  Thus, the finances of the public pension system will depend heavily on the 
age structure of the population, and the finances of Japan’s public pension system are 
deteriorating rapidly due to the rapid aging of her population.  The Japanese 
government has tried to improve the finances of the public pension system by reducing 
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benefits, raising contributions, and raising the age at which pensions are paid, but even 
these reforms have proven to be inadequate.  As a result, many have proposed raising 
the consumption tax and using the additional revenue to bolster the finances of the 
public pension system.  In this section, we discuss the merits and demerits of using 
consumption tax revenue to bolster the finances of the public pension system. 
 Both the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the number one opposition party 
(the Democratic Party of Japan) have proposed raising the consumption tax and using 
the additional revenue to bolster the finances of the public pension system, but their 
proposals differ greatly.  We now discuss the two parties’ proposals in turn. 
 
5.1. The Liberal Democratic Party proposal  
As part of the 2000 reform of the public pension system. it was decided that the 
subsidy from general revenues to the basic pension (a fixed-sum public pension for 
which everyone is eligible) would be increased from one-third to one-half, but it was not 
specified how this increase in the subsidy from general revenue would be financed.  
The most likely financing method is to increase the consumption tax, and the Tax 
Deliberative Council has recommended increasing the consumption tax after “clarifying 
the connection between the higher consumption tax and social security-related 
expenditures.”   However, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has pledged not to raise 
the consumption tax during his tenure, so any hike in the consumption tax will have to 
wait until after his term ends. 
 
5.2. The Democratic Party of Japan proposal 
The Democratic Party of Japan proposes creating a two-tiered public pension 
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system for which everyone is eligible.  The first tier (the National Basic Pension 
(Kokumin Kiso Nenkin)) would be financed by a Pension Earmarked Consumption Tax 
(Nenkin Mokuteki Shouhi-zei), a 3% consumption tax that would be levied on top of the 
current 5% tax.  The second tier (the Earnings-related Pension (Shotoku Hirei 
Nenkin)) would be financed by the pension contributions of current workers and would 
be proportional to the beneficiary’s past earnings.  Two unique features of the 
Democratic Party of Japan’s proposal are (1) that the 3% increment to the consumption 
tax would be used exclusively to finance the National Basic Pension and (2) that the 
amount of the National Basic Pension would not be fixed for everyone but would be 
higher for those with a lower Earnings-related Pension.  In other words, even though 
the 3% consumption tax that would be used to finance the National Basic Pension is 
regressive, the amount of this pension is higher for the low-income and thus the 
regressivity of the way in which this pension is financed would be largely offset by the 
redistributive benefit structure. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
Thus, both the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan 
propose relying on the consumption tax to finance the basic pension (the National Basic 
Pension in the case of the Democratic Party of Japan proposal), but we are against the 
idea of using a regressive tax such as the consumption tax to finance the basic pension.  
However, the Democratic Party of Japan proposes paying a larger National Basic 
Pension to low-income individuals, and doing so would cause the regressivity of the way 
in which this pension is financed to be largely offset by the redistributive benefit 
structure.  Thus, we feel that the proposal of the Democratic Party of Japan is far 
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preferable to the proposal of the Liberal Democratic Party. 
We would actually prefer switching from a pay-as-you-go public pension to a 
fully funded system that pays actuarially fair benefits and financing the unfunded 
liabilities of the public pension system via the issuance of long-term government bonds 
that would be retired gradually so that the burden of these unfunded liabilities would 
be spread out over a number of generations (see Horioka (2001) for details)).  However, 
if implementing this proposal is not politically feasible, we favor the Democratic Party 
of Japan’s proposal as a second-best solution.  
 
6. Fiscal Reconstruction and the Consumption Tax 
 The Japanese government’s outstanding debt as a ratio of GDP is by far the 
highest among the major industrialized nations, due in large part to the repeated 
economic stimulus packages implemented during the decade-long recession, and thus 
fiscal reconstruction is an urgent priority of the Japanese government.  The Japanese 
government plans to rely primarily on hikes in the consumption tax to achieve fiscal 
reconstruction, and its calculations suggest that the consumption tax would have to be 
raised from the current 5% to 21% during the next ten years.   
 However, we are strongly against the use of hikes in the consumption tax to 
achieve fiscal reconstruction, at least if the current highly regressive structure of the 
consumption tax is not changed.  Unless the consumption tax can be converted to an 
expenditure tax, which can be made as progressive as one wants, or the tax rate on food 
and other necessities is set at a low or zero rate, we favor relying instead on increasing 
income tax revenue by stricter enforcement and/or greater progressivity.  In Japan, 
there is widespread evasion of income taxes by the self-employed, farmers, etc., (even 
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though salaried workers are unable to evade income taxes because such taxes are 
automatically deducted from their paychecks), and thus, revenue from the income tax 
could be increased considerably even without changing tax rates if enforcement were 
made stricter (for example, by introducing a taxpayer identification number system, 
increasing the number of tax officials, and/or increasing the proportion of tax returns 
that are audited).  Moreover, stricter enforcement of the income tax would 
simultaneously enhance the inter-occupational equity thereof, thereby killing two birds 
with one stone.  If stricter enforcement of the income tax does not increase tax revenue 
by a sufficient amount, we favor increasing tax revenue by increasing the progressivity 
of the income tax.  Since the burden of income taxes in Japan is far lower than in other 
countries, there is considerable scope for generating more revenue from the income tax 
by increasing its progressivity.  We favor achieving fiscal reconstruction by raising 
revenue from the income tax rather than by raising revenue from the consumption tax 
primarily because of equity considerations.  The income tax is far more progressive 
(and hence more equitable) than the consumption tax to begin with, and moreover, if we 
increase the amount of revenue generated by the income tax by increasing its 
progressivity, the income tax will be made even more equitable at the same time that 
tax revenue is increased, thereby killing two birds with one stone.   
 
7. Policy Recommendations 
In the foregoing sections, we conducted a theoretical analysis of the consumption 
and income taxes from the viewpoints of efficiency and equity, evaluated the past and 
present structure of Japan’s consumption and income taxes, and considered the role of 
the consumption tax in stimulating the economy, in reforming the public pension system, 
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and in achieving fiscal reconstruction.  In this section, we make some policy 
recommendations based on the findings of the foregoing sections. 
 Regarding the structure of the consumption tax, 
(1) We recommend implementing Corlett and Hague’s (1953) rule by raising the 
tax rate of the consumption tax on complements of leisure and lowering the tax rate on 
substitutes for leisure.   
(2) We recommend enhancing the equity of the consumption tax by lowering 
the tax rate on food and other necessities to a low or zero rate.  
Recommendation (1) would enhance both the efficiency and equity of the 
consumption tax, assuming that complements of leisure tend to be luxury goods, while 
recommendation (2) would enhance the equity of the consumption tax but would have 
an adverse impact on its efficiency.   
Regarding the structure of the income tax, 
(3) We recommend alleviating the disincentive effects of the income tax on 
saving by re-introducing tax breaks on saving (capital income).   
(4) We recommend enhancing the equity of the income tax by increasing its 
progressivity. 
Recommendation (3) would enhance the efficiency of the income tax but would, 
at the same time, have an adverse impact on equity (assuming that the share of capital 
income in total income increases with income), but recommendation (4) would enhance 
the equity of the income tax, thereby offsetting the adverse effect of recommendation (3) 
on the equity of the income tax.  Recommendation (4) would, at the same time, have an 
adverse impact on efficiency to the extent that it discourages the labor supply of 
high-income individuals, but this effect would presumably be small since labor supply is 
 22
believed to be relatively inelastic. 
Regarding the three current policy issues discussed above, 
(5) We recommend temporarily lowering or abolishing the consumption tax, 
then gradually increasing it, if the economy should fall back into recession and price 
deflation because such a policy would simultaneously stimulate demand and create 
price inflation. 
(6) We recommend moving from a pay-as-you-go public pension system to a 
fully funded system, but assuming that this is not politically feasible, we support the 
Democratic Party of Japan’s pension reform proposal. 
(7) We recommend achieving fiscal reconstruction not by raising the 
consumption tax but by stricter enforcement and greater progressivity of the income 
tax. 
Regarding recommendation (7), the Japanese government seems intent on 
achieving fiscal reconstruction primarily by raising the consumption tax and has 
calculated that the consumption tax would have to be raised to 21% by 2014 in order to 
achieve fiscal reconstruction.  We are strongly opposed to this proposal because of the 
regressivity of the consumption tax, but if there is no way to avoid implementing the 
government’s proposal, we feel that it is all the more necessary to enhance the efficiency 
and equity of the consumption tax by implementing recommendations (1) and (2).  
Regarding recommendation (2), it is indeed fortunate that the Japanese government’s 
Tax Deliberation Council has indicated its willingness to consider introducing a lower 
tax rate on food when the consumption tax is increased despite possible 
implementational difficulties if there is sufficient public support for such a proposal.   
 We are confident that, if our policy recommendations are implemented, they 
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will make Japan’s tax system more efficient as well as equitable and that they will 
revitalize Japan’s economy. 
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